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Four months into the financial crisis that broke out in late November of
1997, the Korean government embarked on a complete overhaul of the
financial sector. By then two of the six largest commercial banks had
already been nationalised, and the operations of 10 merchant banks were
suspended. Many other banks and non-bank financial institutions had
piled up huge amounts of non-performing loans (NPLs) in their balance
sheets, and the losses resulting from the bad loan accumulation were
driving these institutions into a state of near bankruptcy. The unsound-
ness and instability of financial institutions, in particular commercial
banks, threatened the stability of the financial system, thereby posing
systemic risks to the entire economy.
Beginning in March 1998, the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC),
newly created by consolidating separate institutions for supervision and
regulation of different financial industries, went to work. At the outset,
the FSC decided to revoke the licences or suspend the operations of
non-viable financial institutions; clean up the balance sheets of relatively
healthier institutions; create, through mergers, a relatively small number
of large banks modelled on the best practice banks in the United States
and Europe; and let the restructured banks take charge of corporate
restructuring. To this end, Korean authorities were prepared to spend 
64 trillion won of public resources.
Few countries have been able to manage such an extensive and
comprehensive restructuring of the financial sector in a relatively short
period of time. Because of this aggressive reform, commercial banks 
have become a lot more transparent and healthier than before, and the
confidence of foreign investors and financial market participants in the
Korean economy has largely been restored.
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Other banks with a Basel ratio higher than the 80/0 minimum
requirement were also subjected to diagnostic scrutiny. If their balance
sheets needed improvement and managerial practices did not conform
to international standards, they were asked to take corrective action.
Since implementation of the bank reform began in July 1998, two 
of the seven banks (Hanil and CBK Bank) with conditional approval,
which are also among the six largest Korean banks, merged voluntarily.
Another large bank (Chohung Bank) has gone through a series of
management changes and internal restructuring and will merge with a
regional bank. One regional bank (Chungbuk Bank) has been ordered to
take steps to merge with Chohung Bank. The Korean Exchange Bank
received a capital infusion conditional on management change, staff
reduction, operational consolidation and an additional capital injection by
its major foreign partner. There have also been two other mergers
between four healthier banks. One of the two nationalised banks (Korea
First Bank) has been acquired by a consortium of foreign investors, and
another bank (Seoul Bank) will be sold to a foreign concern in the near
future.
Most of the commercial banks subjected to restructuring have been
successful in carrying out the corrective actions required by the FSC. On
average, they have managed to reduce their manpower by 200/0 and
streamline their organisations by closing down more than 700 branches
so far. Some of the banks have secured foreign partners, and have made
considerable progress in bringing about fundamental changes in their
governance and operational structure.
The Korean government initially projected that the fiscal support
required to clean up banks and other financial institutions would amount
to 64 trillion won. At the end of 1998, the restructuring of commercial
banks had absorbed 40 trillion won (FSC, 1999). Although the available
estimates vary, the commercial bank restructuring will need a lot more
financing than is projected by the government in 1999 if the economy
does not recover from the ongoing crisis.
Non-performing loans and competitiveness of banking
institutions
As of end-September 1998, total non-performing loans classified as 
either substandard, doubtful or estimated loss of 22 commercial banks
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The reform process is, however, by no means over: it has been
plagued by a series of relapses and still faces formidable challenges. This
note discusses some of the unresolved issues and draws several lessons
from Korea’s experience with financial restructuring.
Progress in financial restructuring
According to the FSC’s diagnostic review of financial institutions, 12 out
of 24 banks in Korea were not viable as they failed to meet the minimum
capital adequacy standard as of end-1997. These banks were then
ordered to submit their own rehabilitation plans specifying the measures
of cost cutting, recapitalisation and management changes before the end
of April 1998.1
After due diligence, the FSC concluded that all of the plans submitted
by the 12 banks were not feasible and rejected them at the end of June.
Five banks had their licences suspended, and the remaining seven were
given conditional approval. The five insolvent banks were then acquired
by other healthier banks through purchase and assumption arrange-
ments. Non-performing loans of these failed banks were purchased by
the Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO) at a considerable
discount. The acquiring banks also received capital injections through
public bonds issued by the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation
(KDIC) and guaranteed by the government, which bears interest costs.
Any shortfall in the net value of transferred assets and liabilities was also
covered by the government.
The remaining seven banks with conditional approval were in effect
asked to merge with other banks or find strategic foreign partners 
which could replenish their equity capital and bring in expertise for 
bank management. More specifically, the FSC would purchase their 
non-performing loans and recapitalise them if they satisfied a set of
conditions. To qualify for government support, the seven banks had to
reduce manpower by 45–500/0, streamline headquarters operations,
consolidate the branch network, secure merger or strategic foreign
partners and replace the existing management with a new breed of
bankers recruited from both within and outside the banks.
1 On Korea’s financial restructuring see FSC (1998a) and Claessens, Ghosh and Scott (1998).
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This precautionary measure has done little to improve the standing of
the Korean banks.
The use of a diagnostic standard poses a number of difficult problems
for the Korean authorities. In order to mitigate the confidence problem,
they could provide more financial support to the banks. But this could 
be very costly. From the government point of view, there is also the
question of deciding how much additional support would be adequate,
since the earning prospects of corporate borrowers and hence their
ability to repay depends on the speed of economic recovery.
Higher Basel ratios could help enhance banks’ soundness and stability
in the short run, but would cut into their earning capacities. If this
happens, then it may take a long time for the banks to regain their
competitiveness. This prospect may then undermine their soundness 
and hence weaken their competitiveness further. This competitive
disadvantage could be more serious if financial markets are opened up
while the financial sector restructuring is being carried out. This is
because internationally active banks entering the Korean market could
afford to maintain low Basel ratios as they are able to manage the quality
and risk of their asset portfolios better than domestic banks.
High capital adequacy requirements may also produce perverse
effects on macroeconomic policy management. Knowing that economic
recovery is imminent and could improve the quality of assets held by
commercial banks and hence lessen their burden of holding a large
amount of capital, policy-makers may be more inclined to reflate the
economy than recapitalise the banks.
New governing and operational structure of commercial banks
One of the conditions for the government’s fiscal support for recapi-
talisation is that commercial banks reform their management structures
using US and British banks as a model. According to the FSC’s best
practice model, major decisions concerning banks’ business strategy, risk
management and the appointment and performance evaluation of senior
management would be made by an independent board of directors. The
bank is also to be organised around several business units engaged 
in lending and investment, such as consumer and corporate banking 
and capital market transactions, and supporting units such as general
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amounted to 7.10/0 of total bank loans (FSC, 1998b). Although the 
loan classification standards were strengthened as loans in arrears for
more than three months are now defined as non-performing (instead 
of six months before), the ratio dropped because of the sale of non-
performing loans to KAMCO.
In recapitalising commercial banks, the Korean authorities considered
it prudent to maintain banks’ capital adequacy ratios somewhere in the
range of 10–130/0, higher than the minimum standard, since there were
considerable uncertainties regarding asset qualities, risk concentrations
and other adverse financial conditions at most of the banks. This
increase, it was thought, was vital to restoring the credibility of, and 
the confidence of foreign investors in, the Korean banks. Although the
government has poured in 40 trillion won so far to meet the Basel 
target ratios for capital adequacy among the banks, it is not alto-
gether clear whether Korean banks are any stronger and sounder 
than before in terms of their capacity to bear risks and absorb losses
in the eyes of foreign investors and international financial market
participants.
The credibility problem is related to the lack of agreement on 
the international loan classification standards. At present, any loans in
arrears for more than three months are classified as substandard or
below and non-performing. However, a new trend in banking eschews
the mechanical loan classification in favour of a diagnostic standard, a
classification based on the ability of borrowers to repay their bank loans.
According to this standard, obtaining a precise figure for non-performing
loans at a bank requires due diligence of its asset portfolios. Since the
ability to repay depends in a large measure on the prospects of earning
performance and cash flow generation of its borrowers, the amount 
of NPLs could vary substantially depending on how macroeconomic
prospects of the economy, among other things, are perceived.
Since the Korean economy has not fully recovered from the financial
crisis and, more importantly, corporate restructuring has just started,
it is argued that a substantial portion of precautionary loans, those loans
in arrears by one to less than three months, should be classified as non-
performing. If the diagnostic standard is adopted, therefore, the official
figure of NPLs may be grossly underestimated. Recognising this problem,
the FSC has set aside 5 trillion won to purchase additional non-
performing loans at the banks that are likely to appear in the future.
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banks retrenched from lending much more than called for. In so doing,
they contributed to prolonging the credit crunch that was initially caused
by tight monetary policy at the early stage of the crisis.
Privatisation of commercial banks
In the process of restructuring the financial sector, the government had
to assume the ownership of a number of major Korean banks. The
government replaced their management and set in motion internal
changes necessary to improve their efficiency and stability. The govern-
ment plans to privatise these banks as soon as strategic investors with
expertise to manage banks can be found. Domestically, they will not find
many qualified buyers; chaebols and large corporations are effectively
barred from owning banks. Even if they are allowed, they may not be able
to mobilise enough capital to purchase banks.
Unable to find qualified domestic buyers, the government may have 
to turn to foreign financial institutions and investors for the sale of
domestic banks at bargain prices. Since domestic banks’ competitiveness
has been so much weakened, the free entry into the Korean financial
market may lead to the foreign domination of Korea’s banking sector. If
the Mexican experience is any guide, the domestic banking sector could
easily be dominated by banks owned and controlled by foreign interests
as weak domestic banks are driven out of the market. The foreign
dominance could raise sensitive social and political issues.
In Korea’s experience, the presence of foreign banking institutions
either as branches or as joint ventures with Korean partners has not
contributed to upgrading the quality of the financial sector or to bringing
in foreign expertise. Instead, they have adjusted to the domestic banking
environment so much that there are not many operational differences
between foreign and domestic banks. At present, foreign banks could
help facilitate the restructuring of the corporate sector as they have
more experience and better skills than the Korean banks. However, if
foreign investors buy Korean banks, they are certain to buy clean banks
and then will not be involved in the workout. It is an open question how
their expertise and experience could be transferred to other Korean
banks wrestling with the disposition of corporate debts.
For more than a year, the government has been searching for suitable
foreign buyers for the two nationalised banks. However, there have not
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administration, information technology and risk management. Departing
from the old structure, branches are to be reorganised basically as sales
outlets instead of full service banking units as they were before.
Unfamiliar with the workings of the new management system, bank
managers and staff find it difficult to adjust to a new environment and
often rebel against the reform. In the light of the experience of banking
reform in other countries, it may take several years to complete the
structural reform at the operational level. The operational reform can 
be costly as well, because bank staff have to be retrained, and during 
the period of adjustment banks also suffer from confusion and lack of
coordination among different business and support units and often lose
deposit and loan customers as they move from an old centralised system
to an untested decentralised structure.
The inertia problem is often compounded by the desire of senior
management as well as the supervisory authorities to turn around a
bank’s performance as soon as possible. As far as top executives are
concerned, an improvement in a bank’s income statement, which is
visible, would help enhance their reputation and also the chances of staff
staying in their jobs, more than progress in operational restructuring,
the benefits of which will only be realised in the long run and are not
visible in the short run. For these reasons, senior management does not
have any strong incentive to develop necessary internal policies and
procedures and deploy adequate resources for implementation of the
reform, all the more so in the face of staff opposition. Top executives are
in fact inclined to sacrifice long-term gains for short-run profitability.
One of the side effects of the financial restructuring has been a
relatively severe credit crunch. Korean commercial banks have been
trying to improve and expand their risk management capacities by
recruiting risk management experts, but the experienced people who
could manage credit, market and other risks involved in bank investment
and lending are in short supply. Having operated for so long under a
tightly controlled regime, the Korean banks have had no need to
strengthen their risk management, but with the speed of market
liberalisation and opening accelerating, they realise a simple mistake or
misjudgment in risk management could easily impair the quality of their
balance sheets. Owing to a lack of experience in analysing credit risks
associated with their lending, in particular to small and medium-sized
firms, and together with the need to increase the BIS ratios, domestic
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jumped up sharply. Since the bulk of non-performing loans at the banks
were overdue loans extended to major Korean chaebols, commercial
banks could not extricate themselves from corporate debt problems.
In addressing both the banking and corporate financial problems, the
Korean authorities chose to restructure commercial banks in advance 
of restructuring corporate debts.3 The underlying argument for the bank-
led approach was that once their soundness was restored, commercial
banks would be in a position to lead corporate restructuring. This
approach was consistent with market liberalisation policy and has a
number of advantages, as Claessens and et al (1998) point out. In a
market oriented economy, the government should not involve itself
directly in restructuring corporate debts, as government intervention
would, among other things, result in a repetition of the moral hazard 
of bailouts, in the end causing higher costs of restructuring. Since the
government guarantees banks’ liabilities, the banks are in fact responsible
for corporate restructuring.
Despite some of the apparent advantages of the bank led approach,
it has not worked as well as it was expected. The fundamental problem
of this approach is that five of the largest banks – FKB, Seoul, Chohung,
KEB and Hanvit, which account for the lion’s share of total borrowings
by Korea’s 30 chaebols from commercial banks – have in effect been
nationalised after the restructuring. Except for a few smaller national
banks and regional banks, the government now owns practically all large
commercial and specialised banks in Korea and hence should ultimately
bear the responsibilities of restructuring corporations.
However, the Korean authorities have been reluctant to direct the
corporate restructuring for ideological and political reasons, the banks
do not believe that they have either financial clout or authority, and
those workout candidates, for understandable reasons, have been
uncooperative. The lack of clarity on sharing responsibilities and coordi-
nation among the major players has delayed the restructuring process.
Questions have been raised as to whether the major creditor banks
have developed an institutional capacity adequate to dispose of the
massive debts of a large number of corporations, especially those of
chaebols. Korean chaebols are also too big and too powerful for the
creditor banks to resolve their debts on their own. Even for smaller
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been many foreign investors interested in buying Korean banks. Korea
First Bank, one of the two banks which were put on the market for sale
to foreign investors, has been taken over recently by a consortium of
foreign investors after a long period of negotiation. The sales negotiation
dragged on because the interested buyer and the Korean government
could not agree on the put-back option, that is, the disposition of new
NPLs that surface during the first two years, which the buyer wanted the
Korean government to assume. The negotiation for the sale of another
government-owned bank, Seoul Bank, has met similar problems, although
the bank is expected to be sold soon.
If these experiences are any guide, foreign investors with capital and
expertise in managing banks may not be easily found. Indeed, it may 
take a long time to privatise government owned banks. Until suitable
investors are found at home or abroad, the government will continue 
to assume the responsibilities of ownership. The government is not
expected to intervene in day-to-day operations of these banks except 
to exercise its voting rights as a major stockholder.
But many people are openly questioning whether the Korean
authorities could adhere to a hands-off policy, given the long tradition 
of government intervention in the management of financial institutions.
Commercial banks leading corporate restructuring
One of the major structural problems that precipitated the crisis 
in Korea was excessive corporate borrowing, much of which was 
short-term. The debt/equity ratios of some of Korea’s major industrial
conglomerates rose to 5000/0 at the start of the financial crisis. With the
increase in interest rates, the debt burden became so severe that most
Korean firms, both small and large, could not remain solvent. With 
the onset of the crisis, the Korean authorities realised early on that 
the resolution of corporate debt problem was a prerequisite for the
recovery of the economy from the financial crisis.2
Immediately after Korea agreed to the IMF programme that raised
the market interest rate above 300/0 per annum, some of the relatively
small chaebols went bankrupt and the number of business failures
2 On Korea’s corporate restructuring, see Lieberman and Mako (1998) and FSC (1998c). 3 See Lieberman and Mako (1998) and FSC (1998c).
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It is widely recognised that without both financial and operational
restructuring, Korea will remain vulnerable to systemic crises. How 
does the government induce the corporations to undertake operational
restructuring?
The Korean government’s strategy has so far used the debt restruc-
turing – debt write-off and extension and debt/equity swaps – as 
an incentive for the operational restructuring. The strategy, however,
has conflicted with macroeconomic management. Beginning in the 
fourth quarter of 1998, there have been many signs suggesting that the
economy is coming out of the recession. The economy is forecast to
grow by 4–50/0 in 1999 as against a minus figure only a few months ago.
The sovereign rating of Korea has moved up to investment grade. The
stock market has also recovered, increasing the possibility of raising
equity capital.
This sharp turnaround in growth prospects has also affected the
behaviour of corporations in their debt workout negotiations with the
banks. Korea’s major chaebols are starting to believe that with some 
luck they might be able to ride out the debt crisis. Certainly, the bullish
expectations on the future expansion of the economy suggest to both
the corporations and the banks that the amounts of financial support
needed for the corporations will decline. The greater availability of
liquidity will then weaken the resolve of both the banks and the corpo-
rations to proceed with their workout plans. Since the creditor banks
are also reluctant to get actively involved in the debt workout, they may
tend to slow down or delay the workout process on the grounds that
the economic recovery is likely to change the profile of corporate debts.
The rise in unemployment may indeed call for expansionary mone-
tary and fiscal policy as corporates’ earning prospects improve. There
seems to be a trade-off between corporate restructuring, on the one
hand, and macroeconomic policy supporting economic recovery on the
other. The Korean policy-makers have yet to find an optimal strategy
which will promote growth without jeopardising economic restructuring.
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firms, banks have shown themselves reluctant to play an active role in the
debt workout, for fear of being held responsible in case the workout
does not succeed and also because of the social and political conse-
quences of failure.
Currently, seven companies including 65 affiliates belonging to 24
chaebols are undertaking workout processes, but there are indications
that in many cases creditor banks were unable to control those firms
under the workout arrangements because they could not agree on how
the debts should be restructured, and in some cases the workout
process has served to keep alive insolvent firms instead of helping viable
firms with short-term financial and management problems to improve
their financial and competitive strength.
Recognising these constraints, the government took a major initiative
in December in restructuring the nation’s top five chaebols in coopera-
tion with the creditor banks.4 The leading role of the government 
in corporate restructuring raises a number of difficult questions. The
debt restructuring may involve debt/equity swaps and hence result in
commercial banks holding large amounts of corporate equities. Since the
banks are, in fact, nationalised, the government will end up owning a large
number of corporations in Korea.
The bank-led approach was chosen to mitigate the moral hazard of
bailouts that occurs when the government is directly involved, but in 
the end the government is unable to avoid the problem. Therefore, the
strategy to clean up banks before addressing corporate debt problems
may require repeated recapitalisation because of the slow progress in the
workout and the corporate equities held by commercial banks which
cannot be disposed of quickly.
The bank-led approach poses a more fundamental problem related to
macroeconomic management. Korea’s major corporations including
those belonging to the chaebols must not only restructure their massive
debts, but also carry out the restructuring at the operational level. For
example, they should: consolidate their business lines to concentrate on
core ones where they have competitive advantage; institute corporate
governance with an independent board of directors; adopt international
accounting and disclosure standards; and develop a more profit oriented
corporate culture.
4 See FSC (1998d).
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